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Abstract
After the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 EU countries followed di⁄erent employment
pathes. Employment and wage levels, for instance, are quite unevenly distributed across
Europe. Some of the member states expect labour shortages due to demographic change
in the future. If this is the case, wages will rise when the shortages occur. From literature
on migration it is well known that regions with relatively higher income levels and a
lower risk of unemployment are typical destination countries for immigration. Thus,
European regions might be expected to become rather mixed in cultural terms in the
future. Despite the ￿lling of the labour market and the redistribution of the resource of
labour, the ultimate question raised in the discussion is whether there are additional gains
or losses due to immigration. This work therefore focuses on the impact of migrants on
regional GDP per capita for European regions. Does the proportion of foreigners in the
labour force increase or lower regional income? Does the composition of non-natives with
respect to their countries of origin matter? Both questions are addressed in this study
while controlling for endogeneity. We provide evidence that immigration raises regional
income and a tendency towards (roughly classi￿ed) dominant foreign-born groups reduces
the costs of interaction and integration. Thus, in general immigration has a positive e⁄ect
on regional performance and the costs of immigration in destination regions are balanced
out. Depending on the labour market status of migrants, the regions of orgin of migrants
within the EU face a rise or decline in income as a result of the out￿ ow.
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of this work.1 Introduction
The last few decades have been characterized by improvements in the quality of life and
better health services, especially in western countries such, that we are fortunate to live
longer. At the same time fertility rates have decreased steadily. As a consequence, ￿rstly
countries are becoming older in terms of the average population age and secondly they
are going to shrink. This phenomenon, known as demographic change, is well known in
scienti￿c literature and is frequently discussed in the policy debate. During such a period
a ￿xed retirement age raises the dependency ratio; then, given a certain production level,
labour shortages may occur. Pressure on the social security system increases during a
period of demographic change, especially when the population is becoming older. The
consequences of potential ￿nancial constraints on national ￿nances are less predictable
and open.
There are several suggestions as to how to deal with demographic change. The pressure
on the social security system might be reduced by increasing the retirement age and
women￿ s labour force participation or by recruiting unemployed people. Additionally,
paying lower pensions relaxes ￿nancial budget constraints. Another option is to increase
immigration ￿ ows, whereby young educated people are particularly welcome. The hope
is that these potential workers may reduce labour shortages, pay into the social security
system and partly cushion the adverse e⁄ects of demographic change. Economic literature
on migration highlights key variables which are related to migration ￿ ows. The aim of
this study is not to focus on potential immigration ￿ ows and their e⁄ects on the social
security system, but goes one step further: once the migrants settle down, the question
is whether there are positive or negative e⁄ects on (regional) economic performance due
to migration.
One may hypothesize that migrants have di⁄erent skills and di⁄erent approaches solv-
ing problems, which is advantageous when they work together with people from the host
country, and may then increase productivity. Migrants, of course, have detailed knowl-
edge of the cultures of their home countries. Host-country ￿rms may want to enter foreign
markets and therefore have an interest in employing migrants of that nationality. As a
result of country-speci￿c knowledge the ￿rm may have an advantage and market entry
may potentially be more successful. Both examples make it clear that employing migrants
may increase productivity. However, negative aspects may also occur. For example in the
presence of language barriers or cultural misunderstandings, potential productivity gains
may melt away and the net e⁄ect on productivity could be zero or even negative.
2In economic literature it is argued that migrants have a higher risk of unemployment.
Additionally, they potentially su⁄er from moral hazard when their skills and educational
levels are not (fully) accepted. In this case, self-employment is a strategy for migrants
to earn an income. They may provide ￿ cultural￿consumption goods such as specialized
food, work as specialist hair dressers or Bohemians. Then migrants increase the variety
of (local) consumption goods in a region. The increase in heterogeneous products can be
seen as consumption amenities such that household utility and welfare may increase. In
contrast, the native population might be afraid of foreigners and possibly expect ethnic
con￿ icts or higher crime rates and therefore face a disutility because of immigration. As
was the case for the production side, not only the total number of immigrants but also
the combination of di⁄erent nationalities or the cultural backgrounds of migrants may
matter.
The net e⁄ect of gains and losses of a culturally diverse population is unclear from a
theoretical point of view and therefore empirical evidence should be provided. In the fol-
lowing we focus on the impact of migrants on regional economic performance by analysing
the impact on GDP per capita. The structure is as follows. The next section reviews re-
lated literature. Section 3 provides a theoretical outline of how the cultural background
can explain di⁄erences in GDP per capita. We adopt an augmented Solow model and
derive an empirically testable model. Section 4 introduces the data set and additional con-
trol variables and is followed by a descriptive analysis. Section 6 shows regression results
and discusses the results of the estimates. Finally, the paper closes with a conclusion.
2 Review of existing literature on cultural diversity
There is a growing stock of literature analysing the in￿ uence of cultural diversity on eco-
nomic performance, mainly through cross-country approaches. An early study in this line
is the paper by Easterly and Levine (1997). They pay explicit attention to the remark-
able e⁄ects of ethnic diversity across countries on economic growth. Easterly and Levine
(1997) argue that Africa￿ s growth failure is deeply rooted in the existence of ethnic con￿ icts
and that per capita GDP growth is inversely related to ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
For their measurement of ethnic fragmentation they use indices based on ethno-linguistic
classi￿cation derived from data from the former Soviet Union. Subsequent work con￿rms
their results. Alesina et al. (2002) broaden the empirical approach of Easterly and Levine
(1997) by introducing new measures of cultural diversity that permit a di⁄erentiation
3between ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. They provide substantially dif-
ferent evidence depending on the classi￿cation they apply. By analysing the in￿ uence
on economic growth they broadly con￿rmed the results obtained by Easterly and Levine
(1997) when ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are considered. Both types are associ-
ated with negative growth of GDP per capita. However, religious fractionalization does
not a⁄ect growth rates signi￿cantly. Collier (2001) argues that cultural fractionalization
has a negative e⁄ect on productivity and growth in non-democratic regimes whereas this
is not the case for democracies. However, Collier cannot ￿nd any signi￿cant e⁄ects of
religious diversity. Inspired by the evidence provided by Collier (2001), Alesina and La
Ferrara (2004) revisit the e⁄ect of diversity on economic performance and con￿rms Col-
lier￿ s (2001) ￿nding that religious diversity has no e⁄ect on economic growth by employing
a fractionalization index. Furthermore they show that the negative e⁄ect of diversity is
stronger for countries that exhibit lower income levels. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) argue that both ethno-linguistic and religious diversity may be a potential mea-
sure for a strong con￿ ict dimension. Therefore they suggest a new measure which aims to
capture the potential for con￿ ict in heterogeneous societies based on a polarization index
instead of the fractionalization index. Their results indicate that a higher degree of eth-
nic and religious polarization has a large and negative impact on economic development
through indirect channels such as civil war.
Besides the evidence on losses resulting from cultural diversity, there is also a strand
of literature which substantiates the existence of bene￿ts from heterogeneous societies.
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) investigate the impact of cultural diversity on the economic
life of US cities through the wages of the native population. Allowing for imperfect
substitutability between natives and foreigners, the authors ￿nd a signi￿cant and robust
positive correlation between cultural diversity and the wages of white US-born workers.
They additionally point out that the bene￿ts emerging from migrants who have integrated
are larger than those from new immigrants that have not integrated in the host country.
Similarly, Bellini et al. (2008) follow the same idea that cultural diversity may a⁄ect
both production and consumption through positive or negative externalities. To identify
the dominant e⁄ect they analysed the joint estimation of a price and income equation.
Their results are consistent with those obtained by Ottaviano and Peri (2005) for US
cities. They focus on NUTS-3 regions of 12 European countries and provide evidence
that diversity is positively correlated with productivity and that the causality runs from
the former to the latter.
D￿ Amuri et al. (2010) investigate the labour market impact of immigration on wages
4and employment in western Germany. The group of new migrants mainly a⁄ects the
employment levels of those in the previous immigration waves. The e⁄ect is statistically
and economically signi￿cant. According to D￿ Amuri et al. (2010) there is a large ad-
verse employment e⁄ect on previous immigrants as well as a small adverse e⁄ect on their
wages. Interestingly, the impact of (substantial) immigration in￿ ows on the wages and
employment levels of natives is relatively small. These asymmetrical results are mainly
driven by a higher degree of substitution between ￿ old￿and ￿ new￿migrants in the labour
market, for instance due to rigid wages. Suedekum et al. (2009) study the impact of
increasing diversity on native employees in western Germany. The analysis is conducted
at local level and concludes that diversity raises productivity at this level. Additionally,
the study reveals the importance of distinguishing between high- and low-skilled foreign
workers. For high-skilled foreign workers, they found that both the size of the group and
the diversi￿cation into di⁄erent nationalities increase the local wage and employment for
native workers. However, for low-skilled foreign workers the e⁄ect is negative. They argue
that the presence of high-skilled foreign workers can be regarded as a positive production
amenity from a regional perspective. Nathan (2011) reaches a similar conclusion for the
UK based on a panel period lasting 16 years. Average productivity and wages rise for
UK-born people on average due to immigration. However Nathan (2011) also provides
evidence of that natives are crowded out when they compete for similar jobs.
Ratna et al. (2009) and Sparber (2010) analyse the macroeconomic e⁄ects of social
diversity in the US based on a state level using cross-sectional data. The empirical in-
vestigations yield mixed results. Whereas Sparber (2010) was unable to ￿nd any causal
relationship between diversity and gross state output per worker, Ratna et al. (2009) ￿nd
evidence that racial diversity reduces GDP growth while linguistic diversity raises GDP
growth. They justify their results with the fact that English is frequently used by non-
native speakers and so the barriers to communication based on race are more pronounced
and enduring than those based on linguistic di⁄erences.
Cheng and Li (2011) consider regional and sectoral ￿rm formation and the role of the
composition of foreigners in terms of racial and cultural diversity. They especially identify
speci￿c sectors where the e⁄ect of fragmentation on ￿rm formation is greater. Cheng and
Li highlight service sectors with special cultural needs in production to supply culturally
diverse products. This evidence con￿rms the arguments of Ottaviano and Peri (2005) as
to why cultural diversity might matter in a positive manner and why foreign-born workers
o⁄er diferent skills.
5The empirical contributions cited above focus on a country or regional level. There
is a branch of literature focusing on ￿rm level in general or in sub-groups of the labour
market, for instance the impact of high-skilled workers on innovation. Niebuhr (2010)
investigates the impact of cultural diversity in the workforce on regional innovation out-
put. She bases her research on a production function which relates innovative output to
R&D input. Instead of using the number of patent applications, she investigates the rela-
tionship between patents and R&D input in per capita terms due to the fact that patent
application is also a⁄ected by the size of the regional economy. Furthermore, in order
to model the relationship between R&D input and output appropriately, Niebuhr (2010)
adds the input variable with a time lag of one year. The regression results support the
hypothesis that di⁄erences in the knowledge and capabilities of workers from diverse cul-
tural backgrounds may enhance the performance of regional R&D sectors. Beyond that,
the results stress the importance of distinguishing between high- and low-skilled work-
ers. Diversity among highly quali￿ed employees is found to have the strongest impact on
innovation output. However, these e⁄ects are based on a diversity measure which refers
to employed migrants, so the positive impact can only be associated with immigrants
who have already integrated. Inspired by the research of Niebuhr (2010), Ozgen et al.
(2011) discuss various e⁄ects of immigration on the innovativeness of European regions.
They base their measures of innovation on the means of the number and types of patent
applications. Ozgen et al. (2011) argue that regions with many immigrants might also
have a larger number of patent application. However, they suggest that there might be
an optimum level for cultural diversity, because the bene￿ts gained from diversity appear
to decrease when a value of the fractionalization index exceeds a critical point. The work
of Parrotta et al. (2011) also con￿rms the positive impact of cultural diversity on in-
novativeness within ￿rms, explaining the incentives for patenting, the number (mass) of
patents and the ability to patent in various, distinct ￿elds.
Besides the impact of innovation on ￿rm performance, Brunow and Blien (2010) and
Parrotta et al. (2010) focus on the impact of cultural diversity on establishment produc-
tivity. Brunow and Blien (2010) ￿nd evidence of productivity gains when the employed
labour force is more diverse. Diversity is measured on the basis of the information about
the employees￿nationalities. They also ￿nd negative e⁄ects, however, which they relate to
the "Babel" e⁄ect. The more foreign nationalities are employed the lower productivity is.
The study by Parrotta et al. (2010) partially supports these ￿ndings. In this work, posi-
tive e⁄ects are due to human capital diversity, especially in skills and education. Ethnic
diversity has no or only an insigni￿cant impact on ￿rms￿total factor productivity.
6So far, the focus has been on regional or ￿rm level. Additionally, attention was paid
to innovativeness resulting from a culturally diverse work force, which is also related to
production. Longhi (2011) analyses the impact of cultural diversity on individual wages
and on various aspects of job satisfaction. In her study signi￿cant e⁄ects occur as long
as endogeneity and individual ￿xed e⁄ects are not controlled for. If this is done, the
positive e⁄ect of the simpler econometric model disappears. However, the simpler model
also considers variation between individuals. Then, living in a more rather than a less
diverse environment adds a premium in terms of wages or job satisfaction.
Based on the evidence in the literature we conclude that the e⁄ect of cultural diversity
on productivity or growth is unclear and depends on the measure applied, the level of
aggregation and the underlying background (racial, ethnic, linguistic, etc.). Most studies
identify gains as long as con￿ icts are not considered, but the literature also shows that
negative e⁄ects occur as well. Thus, based on the review we expect a positive, a negative
or an insigni￿cant impact of cultural diversity on regional income. Most studies in this
￿eld use cross-sectional data to identify the e⁄ect. However, Islam (1995) discusses a
serious parameter bias when country- or region-speci￿c e⁄ects are not taken into account.
The next section derives the theoretical framework to test the relevance of cultural
diversity on regional productivity empirically while controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects.
3 Theoretical framework
In the introduction several mechanisms suggest that a culturally diverse population may
yield gains or losses. They might occur on the production or the consumption side. Some
studies focus on ￿rm or establishment data to reveal these e⁄ects from a production-side
perspective. However, these studies cannot focus on the consumption side directly. We
are interested in the general e⁄ect at regional level. Regional income Y is generated by
K units of capital and L units of labour and H units of human capital under constant
returns to scale. We adopt the production technology suggested by Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) and augment it by a (culturally) heterogeneous labour force as Ottaviano and


















7where A(￿) describes the total factor productivity, which grows at an exogenous rate
g. The parameter ￿ relates to the elasticity of substitution between employees of M
di⁄erent cultural backgrounds. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) also introduce a negative e⁄ect
of cultural diversity from a theoretical perspective and capture this issue in 1 ￿ ￿; 0 ￿
￿ ￿ 1. Like Ottaviano and Peri (2005), we see ￿ as an increasing function of the degree of
cultural diversity. Then, 1 ￿ ￿ captures a potential negative e⁄ect of a culturally diverse
labour force on regional productivity. In contrast, the CES index introduces gains from
cultural diversity. Let sm = Lm=L be the proportion of employees from the mth employed




























1￿￿￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)DIV ]
1￿￿￿￿ (3)
Obviously the culturally diverse labour force can be understood as a Hicks-neutral process.
We divide total production Y by the regional population B and follow the decomposition
of the labour force suggested by Brunow and Hirte (2006). This approach introduces
labour market variables into our model, namely participation p and the unemployment






￿ [p(1 ￿ u)]
1￿￿￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)DIV ]
1￿￿￿￿ : (4)
This equation contains the stock of physical and human capital per capita as explanatory
variables. Both variables are highly endogenous because they depend on relative prices.
For that reason we derive the steady state value. We assume a common and constant
depreciation rate ￿ for both types of capital and assume that the labour force grows at
rate n. We refrain from modelling technological progress, since our time period is rather
short.
We label sk and sh as the investment share of total output for physical and human
capital, respectively. The dynamic equations and the steady-state values read as
dk = sky ￿ (n + g + ￿)k; k
￿ =
sky
(n + g + ￿)
(5)
dh = shy ￿ (n + g + d)h; h
￿ =
shy
(n + g + ￿)
(6)
8and are expected to be zero in the long-run. With some manipulations we eventually












1￿￿￿￿ [p(1 ￿ u)][(1 ￿ ￿)DIV ]: (7)
This equation is the baseline for our empirical speci￿cation and describes the in￿ uence of
variables on di⁄erences in steady-state values. For instance, a larger share of human cap-
ital raises income, whereas a relatively lower participation rate reduces regional GDP per
capita. Mankiw, Romer and Weil additionally derive a growth regression where regional
income growth is explained by the income level at the beginning of the time period. As
is shown below, our data set covers a relatively short time period. This means that we
cannot take su¢ ciently into account the endogeneity problem described by Caselli et al.
(1996). Therefore we keep to our approach and answer the question of whether di⁄erences
in income are additionally explained by distinct levels of regional cultural diversity. Islam
(1995) points out that parameter estimates are potentially biased when region-speci￿c
e⁄ects are not taken into account. Since our research ￿elds are regions which we observe
over time, we control for region-speci￿c e⁄ects ￿r and time ￿xed e⁄ects ￿t. The work
of Lopez-Bazo et. al. (2004), Ertur and Koch (2007), and most recently Fischer (2011)
extend the neoclassical growth speci￿cation to take into consideration technological in-
terdependence, physical and human capital externalities appearing among regions. What
all these approaches have in common is that spatial dependencies between regions are
controlled for. However, these models are suitable for an investigation examining cross-
sectional data in the context of economic growth. At this stage of the analysis we retain
the parsimonious model which does not control for inter-regional spillover e⁄ects, and
focus on the diversity issue while employing panel data.
Taking the log of (7) and adding an error term yields our regression model
lnyr = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(nr + g + ￿) + ￿2 lnskr + ￿3 lnshr
+￿4 ln[pr (1 ￿ ur)] + ￿5 ln[(1 ￿ ￿r)DIVr] + ￿r + ￿t + "r;
which we examine empirically in the next sections.
94 Variables and data
This section presents our data set and the construction of variables and provides a de-
scriptive analysis.
We combine the Eurostat regional database with the European Labour Force Survey
(ELFS), both provided by Eurostat, the Statistical O¢ ce of the EU. The regional classi-
￿cation is based on the NUTS 2 level of aggregation. The advantage of the NUTS 2 over
the NUTS 3 level is that it overcomes strong spatial interdependencies emerging at the
NUTS 3 level due to a common labour market and commuting ￿ ows between regions or
vertical linkages of upstreaming industries nearby located.
The ELFS data come from a household survey which basically gathers labour market
characteristics and individual information about household members. It is representative
at the NUTS 2 level. Our panel spans the time period from 2003 to 2008. Detailed
information on the cultural background is only available from 2004 until 2008. Therefore
the data from 2003 are only needed for the construction of lagged values. There are no
data on the cultural background for Polish regions, so we have to exclude Poland from
our sample. The same problem appears for Italy in 2004, so we cannot construct lagged
variables for Italian regions in 2005. There is also a lack of data for some countries in
individual years, which means that we are considering an unbalanced panel. Furthermore,
we can only consider Norway and Iceland as single regions, i.e. at the country level.
Because of unreasonable values for 2006 and 2007 we have to exclude the French region
FR83 for both years. We also exclude some Spanish regions (the exclaves ES63, ES64, and
the Canary Islands ES70) and the Portugese islands (Azores PT20 and Madeira PT30).
Because the ELFS is a household survey it does not necessarily represent the regional
population. Each respondent is therefore assigned an individual weighting factor in order
to ensure representativeness. The factors are provided along with the ELFS data. We
take these weighting factors in account when we construct and aggregate variables at
regional level.
From the regional data basis of Eurostat we use data for the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) measured in purchasing power parities to take di⁄erent price levels into account.
Furthermore, we use the regional population data to construct the GDP per capita mea-
sure as a proxy for lnyr. The population growth rate nr is constructed using the di⁄erence
between births and deaths relative to the population. For the UK these data are not avail-
able, so we calculate nr as the change in the population instead.
Based on the regional gross investments we might compute the investment share to
10cover the capital investments sk. Unfortunately, capital investment data are not available
for all time periods and in particular not for the UK. We therefore have to exclude the
investment variable and face an omitted variable bias. The bias is reduced because of the
￿xed e⁄ects model.
The ELFS collects information about the educational level of respondents. We use
that information to construct the proxy of human capital sh, measured as the proportion
of people holding a university degree. As a proxy for sh we use the lagged values because
it is reasonable to assume that returns on investments occur some time later. In addition
we construct the proportion of migrants with a university degree relative to all people with
such a degree and label it as s
migrants
h . The term pr (1 ￿ ur) which described the labour
market is also calculated on the basis of the ELFS data, and is covered by the questions
about participation and unemployment. Variables capturing the cultural background are
also taken from the ELFS, which provides two types of information on this issue. First,
respondents are asked for their country of birth, and second for their nationality, both
of which are grouped into 8 macro-regions. Since we are more interested in cultural
di⁄erences and not in the legal status, we use the country of birth to compute diversity
measures. Because in some countries the country of birth was not surveyed or respondents
did not answer, we use nationality as a weaker proxy instead2.
As our model suggests, the cultural background of employees or self-employed individ-
uals is mainly of importance, since we focus on production. Therefore, we do not consider
children up to the age of 15 or pensioners3. Another reason to exclude children is that
some countries do not report individuals under the age of 16.
Besides the proportion of foreigners smigrants, we also compute measures that capture
the degree of diversity among foreigners. As outlined in the literature review, various
measures are suggested. It is worth noting that there is no best proxy and therefore we
compute three common measures, namely the fractionalization index, a Her￿ndahl-like
index and ￿nally a polarization index. Let sm be the proportion of the mth group of M
2This is especially the case for Germany.
3We still include respondents over the age of 65 who are active in the labour market.























There is a crucial di⁄erence between the ￿rst two measures and the third one. The
fractionalization and the Her￿ndahl-like measures increase with the degree of cultural
diversity and especially the more equally distributed the shares are. The polarization
index, on the other hand, increases in the presence of two dominant groups. As can
easily be seen, when there are two groups, each with a share of 0.5, the index reaches
its maximum at 1. Thus the polarization index identi￿es the presence of two dominant
groups out of M distinct groups.
After the presentation of the data and the variables under consideration, we now turn
our attention to the descriptive analysis.
5 Descriptive analysis
The upper part of Figure 1 shows the income distribution on the left and the proportion
of human capital on the right. The second row displays the distribution of non-natives
as a proportion of the total population and the diversity among non-natives. The band
width is chosen in such a way that each class contains approximately the same number of
observations, so that the interpretation of each colour is equal to percentiles. The regions
coloured yellow are those not included in the data set. The data relate to the year 2005.
12Figure 1: Regional distribution of main variables
As can be seen, the proportion of migrants is not necessarily larger in wealthier regions,
although there is still a clear pattern in which regions with higher incomes are in favour
of in-migration and therefore, the share of non-natives increases. Interestingly, even more
than 15 years after the breakdown of the socialist countries, the proportion of foreigners is
still small in these regions. The cultural mix among foreigners is shown in the lower right
panel. It reveals that regions with a relatively low level of non-natives could nevertheless
be highly diverse in cultural terms. There are also regions with a large proportion of
immigrants and a high degree of diversity. In contrast, a large proportion of non-natives
and low diversity means that there has to be a dominant group of foreigners, since the
measure increases with the degree of diversity.
13Figure 2: Correlation between GDP per capita and the share of non-natives
14Figure 2 plots the proportion of non-natives against the log of GDP per capita within
regions to obtain deeper insights into a potential correlation. The larger the proportion
of migrants the higher GDP per capita is, giving a ￿rst indication that migrants may
improve regional productivity and income. Interestingly, this pattern holds for di⁄erent
European macro-regions in which the average income and the immigration history are
quite distinct. However, endogeneity issues also arise: A well-performing region, whether
wealthy or not, may o⁄er higher wages, making this region more attractive for immigration
relative to other regions. We should therefore focus on the immigration structure and the
distribution of migrants.
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the proportion of migrants as a percentage
of the population in EU macro-regions for the years 2004 and 2008. Besides the average
proportion of the total population, the relative average proportion of the foreign popula-
tion is also reported. As can be seen, the data only allow the observation of 8 distinct
groups of migrants. The diversity measures are calculated from these groups. For in-
stance, in western European regions the average proportion of EU 15 foreigners in the
total population is 3.6 % and these 3.6% are 35.5% of all foreigners in 2004. As shown, the
cultural mix increased in all three macro-regions during the sample period. Interestingly,
migrants from former socialist countries seem to settle more frequently in the southern
parts of Europe. On the other hand, eastern European regions mainly attract people from
the EU itself but not from the rest of the world. Focusing on the relative proportion of
all foreigners reveals that the former socialist regions mainly attract foreigners from other
former socialist regions. This could be because of language similarities (Slavic languages).
The descriptive table does not immediately con￿rm the fact that migrants prefer only re-
gions with higher income levels for immigration, because smigrants rose in all sub-groups
of European regions.
What is also known from migration literature is that migrants tend to settle in regions
with a lower risk of unemployment. This probability is generally lower in more densely
populated regions. The proportion of human capital is also larger in densely populated
(agglomeration) regions, which raise problems of identi￿cation when the two variables are
correlated with each another. A simple correlation between the proportion of migrants
and the human capital measure lnsh is 0.40, which provides ￿rst evidence of this. The
correlation after absorbing the region ￿xed e⁄ects is even higher, namely 0.45.
Table 2 provides an overview of our main variables, some of them not presented in log
form. Besides the total variation of the sample it also reports the variation after the ￿xed
e⁄ects transformation has been performed. In the latter case no mean reported, since it
15Table 1: Average and relative population share of migrants within EU regions
European Regions
West1 South2 Former Soc.3
shareA relativeB shareA relativeB shareA relativeB
2004 (as %)
EU 15 3.6 35.5 1.1 18.6 0.1 6.2
New Member States 12 0.4 4.7 0.7 11.2 0.6 47.2
Europe outside EU 27 1.7 18.6 1.6 28.2 1.4 37.4
Other Africa 0.8 8.0 0.7 8.3 0.0 1.0
North Africa, Near/Middle East 1.8 16.2 0.5 6.4 0.1 1.7
East and South Asia 1.0 10.9 0.1 1.5 0.1 4.5
Latin America 0.3 3.0 1.7 23.1 0.0 1.0
North America and Australia 0.3 3.0 0.1 2.7 0.0 0.9
Share of non-natives smigrants 9.9 6.5 2.3
2008 (as %)
EU 15 4.1 33.8 1.3 14.3 0.1 4.3
New Member States 12 0.9 7.2 1.6 14.6 0.9 49.6
Europe outside EU 27 1.9 19.3 2.3 27.3 1.8 34.9
Other Africa 1.0 8.9 0.7 6.0 0.0 0.1
North Africa, Near/Middle East 2.2 19.2 1.2 10.8 0.2 5.0
East and South Asia 0.7 7.0 0.5 4.6 0.1 4.3
Latin America 0.3 2.8 2.7 19.9 0.0 0.8
North America and Australia 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.5 0.0 1.0
Share of non-natives smigrants 11.3 10.5 3.1
1 AT, BE, DE excl. eastern Germany, DK, FI, FR, IE, IS, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK; 2 ES, GR, IT, PT;
3 CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK, eastern Germany;
A Share of group as a % of the total population; B share of group as a % of the
foreign population; Source: EU Labour Force Survey; own calculations
16is zero. There are some regions with very low participation and employment levels, which
in turn means a very high dependency ratio. On the other hand, in some regions over
half of the population participates in the labour market and works. When we examine
the transformed data set we ￿nd that changes in participation and unemployment rates
occur. Focusing on n + g + ￿ clearly shows that European regions do not grow or shrink
much during the sample period in terms of population growth. Both, ￿ and g are ￿xed
values and we use 0.08 for the sum, which is a common value emerging in the literature.
The average proportion of migrants within regions is 8% and ranges from zero to over
45%. The regions with the largest proportion of non-natives are Brussels, London and
Luxemburg.
Table 2: Overview of main variables
Overall variation Fixed e⁄ects transformed
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Std. Dev. Min Max
lny 9.989 0.37 8.537 11.156 0.062 -0.233 0.214
p(1 ￿ u) 0.43 0.049 0.256 0.563 0.01 -0.036 0.032
(n + g + ￿) 0.05 0.003 0.074 0.091 0 -0.002 0.003
sh 0.192 0.074 0.059 0.413 0.016 -0.094 0.058
s
migrants
h 0.079 0.07 0 0.586 0.014 -0.067 0.094
smigrants 0.081 0.068 0 0.453 0.013 -0.066 0.065
Fractionalization 1.673 0.207 1 1.96 0.057 -0.423 0.293
neg: Herfindahl 0.641 0.175 0 0.845 0.055 -0.462 0.266
Polarization 0.673 0.137 0 1 0.069 -0.656 0.532
Note: Some variables not in log form; Source: EU Labour Force Survey; own calculations
The correlation structure between the diversity measures and the log of GDP per
capita is 0.5 for the fractionalization index, 0.4 for the Her￿ndahl-like index and about
0.1 for the polarization index. All three correlation structures vanish after the ￿xed e⁄ects
transformation. The correlation drops to values between 0.02 and 0.07. The impact of
the combination of migrants on income might be negligible. The ￿rst impression obtained
by using bivariate correlation seems to suggest that immigration has a positive e⁄ect on
regional income. However, does this picture remain when other e⁄ects are controlled for?
To this end the next section focuses on regression analysis.
176 Regression analysis
In the previous section we derived a regression model inspired by a neoclassical production
function which reads as
lnyr = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(nr + g + ￿) + ￿2 lnskr + ￿3 lnshr
+￿4 ln[pr (1 ￿ ur)] + ￿5 ln[(1 ￿ ￿r)DIVr] + ￿r + ￿t + "r:
There are no data available for regional investments. Therefore ￿2 cannot be estimated
and the time-constant part of skr is contained in the region-speci￿c e⁄ect ￿r. Because
of the complementary and substitutable relationship between sh and sk, the explanatory
variables are correlated with ￿r. Therefore a ￿xed e⁄ects model is preferred over random
e⁄ects models on the basis of theory. This result is con￿rmed when estimates of the
random e⁄ects model are compared with the ￿xed e⁄ects estimates. We therefore do
not provide random e⁄ects estimates due to their inconsistency. We operationalize the
(1 ￿ ￿)DIV term by using smigrants and the di⁄erent diversity measures.
As already mentioned, the migration decision is made on the basis of wage di⁄erentials
between migrant￿ s potential host country and his or her home country. One might expect
better performing regions to attract foreigners more frequently, which in turn would raise
the proportion of non-natives in that particular region. We partially overcome that prob-
lem by using a regional ￿xed e⁄ects model but also explicitly control for endogeneity. Any
estimates are e¢ cient for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. In all of the models region-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects and time ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for. Additionally, increases in produc-
tivity and thus in income in former socialist countries might be expected. This catch-up
e⁄ect cannot be explained by the variables under consideration. Therefore we also in-
teract the time dummies with a dummy variable for Eastern European regions including
eastern Germany (without Berlin) and add it to our empirical model. It emerges that
these dummy variables are always highly signi￿cant and positive4, providing evidence of
this catch-up e⁄ect.
We estimate various models. The Base model does not control for cultural diversity
issues. The Share model considers the proportion of all non-natives in the population,
smigrants. If the proportion exhibits a positive sign, then there is a positive correlation
between GDP per capita and the proportion, as suggested in Figure 2. Note that in the
4The reference year for the dummy estimates is 2004.
18￿xed e⁄ects analysis we cannot state that an increase in the number of migrants improves
regional income because we do not test causality. Models DIV 1 to DIV 3 control for the
fragmentation of the non-natives in a particular region, employing the fractionalization
index (DIV 1), the Her￿ndahl-like index (DIV 2) and ￿nally the polarization index
(DIV 3) as outlined in equations (8) to (10). These three models answer the question
of whether there are additional gains (or losses) the more fragmented (diverse) the non-
natives are with respect to their country of birth or whether a tendency towards dominant
groups raises GDP per capita.
Table 3: Panel Fixed E⁄ects Regression on GDP per capita for EU regions
lny Base Share DIV 1 DIV 2 DIV 3
ln[p(1 ￿ u)] 0.419*** 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.409***
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.083)
ln(n + g + ￿) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lag lnsh 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
smigrants 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.092
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079)
Diversity1 0.002 0 0.032
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
Region Fixed E⁄ects, Time Fixed E⁄ects,
East European Countries*Time Fixed E⁄ects
F 172.0*** 163.0*** 150.1*** 150.9*** 152.7***
RMSE 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
within R2 0.881 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.882
overall R2 0.234 0.264 0.266 0.264 0.261
between R2 0.278 0.317 0.322 0.318 0.318
valid cases 741 741 741 741 741
No. of regions 171 171 171 171 171
Note: robust s.e. in (); * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; 1 Diversity measures are
the fractionalization index for DIV 1, the Her￿ndahl index for DIV 2,
and the polarization index for DIV3
The ￿xed e⁄ects regression analysis provides ￿rst results, which are presented in Table
3. A look at the F-test of the estimation results shows that the explanatory variables of
our models are jointly signi￿cant. Let us take a ￿rst look at the evidence. An increase in
the participation and employment rates is positive and highly signi￿cant. Of course, the
19lower the dependency ratio, the higher the sum of wage payments is and this in turn makes
a region relatively wealthier. In the context of demographic change the participation rate
will decline during the transition period, when the proportion of the elderly as a percentage
of the total population is relatively larger, which lowers regional income.
Contradicting neoclassical theory, an increase in n + g + ￿ raises GDP per capita. As
Ozgen et al (2010) show by conducting a meta-analysis, a positive value is expected in
the case of spillover e⁄ects of technological progress. This positive value is very robust
even in the IV estimates shown below. In the computation g+￿ was set at 0.08 where we
assume that g = 0:03 and ￿ = 0:05. The study by Fischer (2011) suggests the frequently
used value of g + ￿ = 0:05. Using this value changes the results with respect to the
ln(n + g + ￿) term. It is then negative and signi￿cant for the proportion and diversity
models. It exhibits parameter values in the range of -0.11 to -0.15. These values are
insigni￿cant when the endogeneity of foreigners is controlled for. Despite the sign and
signi￿cance of the ln(n + g + ￿) term, most of the other estimates are una⁄ected with
regard to its value and signi￿cance such that our conclusion does not depend on the
de￿nition of g + ￿.
As expected, an increasing stock of human capital improves regional performance and
thus GDP per capita. The elasticity is about 9.3 %. A larger stock of human capital
promotes regional income. We will discuss the in￿ uence of human capital in more detail
later, when the endogeneity of foreigners is controlled for.
Bearing Figure 2 in mind, it is somewhat surprising that neither the proportion nor the
diversity of immigrants has a signi￿cant impact on regional income, allthough one might
expect the proportion to have a positive impact. Once we control for region and time
￿xed e⁄ects and other well established variables, the possible positive e⁄ect of cultural
diversity disappears.
However, as was mentioned earlier, the proportion of migrants is highly endogenous.
We therefore estimate the same models but treat the proportion of migrants as an en-
dogenous variable. From migration literature we know that network e⁄ects of migrants
exist. Additionally, if a region and its neighbouring regions already accommodate a larger
proportion of foreigners, then this region might be favourable for new migrants, because
this is an established immigration/ destination area. We therefore add two instruments
to explain the current proportion of migrants: ￿rst, the proportion in the previous period
as an internal instrument. Second, we de￿ne an average proportion of migrants in all
other regions in the previous period as an external instrument. When computing this in-
strument we use a distance-based weighting matrix to give nearby regions a higher weight
20compared to regions further away. This can be understood as a kind of migrant potential.
If, for instance, a region has a relatively large proportion of migrants but the neighbour-
ing regions have hardly any migrants, this region might not be particularly attractive for
further immigrants compared to a region whose neighbouring regions also have a large
number of migrants.
The estimates of the instrumental variable approach are presented in table 4 and
the parameters are derived employing GMM5. All parameters are jointly signi￿cant, as
reported by the F-Test. The Hausman speci￿cation test compares the IV estimates with
the estimates of the ￿xed e⁄ects model presented in table 3. The Hausman test is valid as
the basis of homoscedasticity and is therefore performed under this assumption. The test
statistics indicate that the IV ￿xed e⁄ects models should be preferred over the ￿xed e⁄ects
model. A general problem in IV regressions is that of under- and overidenti￿cation. We
therefore provide the Sargan and Hansen J test for overidenti￿cation and the Kleibergen-
Paap LM statistics of underidenti￿cation (weak instruments). The instruments are strong
enough as con￿rmed by the Kleibergen-Paap test. The tests for overidenti￿cation are also
insigni￿cant, indicating that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of the
regression. This is the relevant assumption for the validity of the chosen instruments.
Other test statistics which are not presented here are in line with the reported statistics.
The overall picture of the estimates concerning variables which do not relate to cul-
tural issues are una⁄ected by the instrumental variable approach. The lagged value of the
human capital variable is only half of its original size, indicating that the parameter was
upwardly biased when the endogeneity of foreigners was not explicitly controlled for. As
already mentioned in the descriptive section, the proportion of high-skilled workers and
the proportion of foreigners are correlated. The proportion of foreigners was downwardly
biased in the pure ￿xed e⁄ects model. Once we control for endogeneity, smigrants is no
longer downwardly biased and the human capital measure is upwardly biased.
With respect to content, regions o⁄er higher incomes the more human-capital-intensive
their production is. Rural regions within the EU typically do not attract much human
capital because of a lack of relevant employment opportunities. Persistent regional dis-
parities are expected to be present and are a constant, long-term outcome within the
EU.
The proportion of migrants is signi￿cant when its endogeneity is explicitely controlled
for. We ￿nd a signi￿cant positive impact of immigrants on average GDP per capita. Note
5We use the STATA Package xtivreg2, provided by Scha⁄er (2010).
21Table 4: Panel Fixed E⁄ects Instrumental Variable Regression on GDP per capita for EU
regions
lny IV Share2 IV DIV 1 IV DIV 2 IV DIV 3
ln[p(1 ￿ u)] 0.338*** 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.321***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
ln(n + g + ￿) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lag lnsh 0.037* 0.038** 0.037* 0.036*
(0.02) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
smigrants 0.981*** 0.945*** 0.984*** 0.916***
(0.372) (0.354) (0.375) (0.348)
Diversity1 -0.016 0.004 0.058**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024)
Region Fixed E⁄ects, Time Fixed E⁄ects,
East European Countries*Time Fixed E⁄ects
F 187.7*** 174.9*** 173.7*** 180.9***
RMSE 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021
within R2 0.854 0.856 0.854 0.861
valid cases 556 556 556 556
No. of regions 160 160 160 160
Sargan Test Value 0.022 0.016 0.025 0.001
Hansen J Test Value 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap 11.9*** 12.5*** 11.8*** 12.2***
Hausman Test 590.5*** 257.9*** 73.5*** -1091.1
Note: robust s.e. in (); * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; 1 Diversity measures
are the fractionalization index for DIV 1, the Her￿ndahl index for DIV 2,
and the polarization index for DIV 3. Sargan and Hausman test
valid for the assumption of homoscedasticity
22that the e⁄ect is rather small since the share of migrants does not enter the regression
model in log form. An increase in the share of migrants by 1 percentage point yields an
income growth6 of almost 0.01. This estimate is lower than that obtained by Ozgen et
al. (2010) who report a value of 0.1 based on meta-analytic evidence. In our case, a 1%
increase in the proportion of foreigners in a regions means a fairly large in￿ ow of migrants
at NUTS 2 level. The overall e⁄ect of immigration in EU regions is thus positive but
small.
So far we have considered immigration, but what about the migrants￿region of origin,
especially when it is one of the regions in our sample? First, when it is mainly employed
workers that migrate, then the dependency ratio of out￿ ow -regions will rise. This e⁄ect
is captured in the lnp(1 ￿ u) term. Then, an out￿ ow of workers results in a loss of
regional income. If, however, unemployed or economically inactive people leave, then
the dependency ratio will decline and the impact on regional GDP per capita will be
positive. Thus, depending on the migrants￿employment status, the out￿ ow -regions do
not necessarily deteriorate. The study of Basile et al. (2010) surveys related literature.
They work out that eastern European regions face a reduction of unemployment because
of the out￿ ow of individuals. However, Basile et al. (2010) also show in their review
that unemployment level equalisation is not given. Etzo (2011) concludes that wage
di⁄erentials and unemployment levels are push factors that in￿ uence the decision for the
out-migration in the case of Italy. Based on the evidence of existing literature we might
conclude that regions gain from out-migration.
Focusing on the diversity issue reveals that fragmentation among foreigners does not
matter with regard to the Her￿ndahl and the fractionalization indices. The composition
becomes signi￿cant for the polarization index. As was shown in the literature review,
the results depend strongly on the measures applied. At least the estimate of the po-
larization index is positive, which indicates that a culturally diverse region gains when
there is a tendency towards two dominant foreign groups. Then, a balanced blend of
foreigners belonging to one of the two groups seems to raise GDP per capita. Accord-
ing to Ottaviano and Peri (2005) di⁄erent groups of foreigners o⁄er special skills, so a
mixture of all cultures should be favourable. Some reasons for the proportion and also
the diversity measure having a positive impact are that migrants provide heterogeneous
products, possess di⁄erent skills and possibly select into distinct jobs and tasks that suit
them best. Then, labour resources are distributed among jobs where they o⁄er the highest
6With regard to immigration, the income growth rate is de￿ned as dy=y = ￿ ￿ dsmigrant, ceteris
paribus.
23returns. Based on the results of the diversity measures and especially the polarization
index we conclude that regions have an advantage when there is a tendency towards dom-
inant groups, which contradicts the ￿ndings of Ottaviano and Peri at ￿rst sight. With
the European Labour Force Survey data, we are able to consider only 8 distinct cultural
backgrounds of foreigners, though they have quite di⁄erent cultural histories even within
these roughly classi￿ed groups. Obviously, an increase in diversity as it is captured by the
Her￿ndahl-like measures of models DIV 1 and DIV2 does not foster income gains. This
does not mean that cultural diversity reduces income. The polarization index only states
that a region has an advantage when the distribution of migrants tends towards dominant
groups. However, within each group the mixture of di⁄erent cultural backgrounds could
be high. This diversity is not captured in the diversity measures but in the proportion of
migrants, which is highly signi￿cant. It is therefore possible that the e⁄ects of cultural
diversity in terms of the distribution of foreigners matter. So it is possible that diversity
within a group matters but that this e⁄ect disappears because of the rough classi￿cation
of migrants￿origins.
The question arises as to which regions bene￿t an advantage from polarization. The
answer is easy - every region would gain from polarization. The logic behind this result
is that we estimate ￿xed e⁄ects models. The ￿xed e⁄ects model examines a change in
the polarization index within a region and this identi￿es the parameter estimate. From a
policy perspective this result seems to be unreasonable, because there are only few reasons
why a region should be interested in dominant groups of foreigners (among the foreigners).
Where cultural diversity has negative e⁄ects these may decrease, the more similar the
foreigners￿cultural backgrounds are. An advantage of homogeneity among migrants could
be interpreted as a factor that can reduce ethnic con￿ ict. From the natives￿perspective
the presence of dominant groups might also reduce integration costs, for example as
a result of an easier reduction of language barriers, provision of migrant-speci￿c public
goods, or it might reduce the fear of contact and thus facilitate the integration of migrants
into the labour market. A tendency towards dominant groups could also be a result of
migrants￿network with their respective home countries and indicates that they attract
further migrants. This attraction of new migrants can be seen as an advantage, however.
In the literature review various ways in which cultural diversity matters are outlined.
One of the branches of literature focuses on innovation abilities (Niebuhr 2010, Ozgen
et al. 2011). We therefore tested various models that take the innovation issue into
account. First, we added the proportion of high-skilled migrants to the model. Second,
24we interacted this proportion with the human capital measure. In this case an increase in
the proportion of foreign-born high-skilled workers might strengthen human capital e⁄ects.
Third, we focused on the diversity of foreign-born human capital. In all three cases we
obtained insigni￿cant results, even after controlling for the endogeneity of migrants. One
reason for this unexpected result could be that the proportion of foreigners in the total
regional stock of human capital is relatively small so the individual impact of this group
of migrants vanishes with regard to average regional income.
To summarize, immigration does not reduce GDP per capita on average. However, a
regional macro-model of this type is not able to separate e⁄ects for di⁄erent groups within
the labour force. It is still possible that a sub-group of the natives or former migrants
have disadvantages when new migrants enter the regional labour market. The impact
of immigration on speci￿c groups of the labour market can be found in Nathan (2011)
and Suedekum et al. (2009) for the UK and Germany, respectively. Both studies show
negative e⁄ects when foreigners and natives compete for speci￿c jobs. Given our data and
modelling approach we cannot separate e⁄ects for sub-groups of natives and migrants.
As mentioned in the introduction, demographic change will a⁄ect regional economic
performance in the future. In particular labour shortages may occur because of a shrinking
society. In order to countervail these labour shortages, attracting migrants seems to
be a reasonable aim from a policy perspective. If there are no gains or losses due to
immigration, an increase in the stock of non-natives would not a⁄ect GDP per capita
in our model. This does not mean that immigration does not a⁄ect economic outcomes,
because the immigrants contribute to the social security systems when they work, relaxing
problems caused by demographic change, and reduce potential labour shortages. We ￿nd
evidence that regional income increases as a result of immigration, which leads us to
conclude that there are positive income e⁄ects on average. When looking at migration
within the EU, it is also necessary to consider the e⁄ects that may occur in the regions
of origin due to the out￿ ows. Depending on the labour market status of migrants before
they leave, regional income might increase or decline after they depart. Then, an EU-wide
policy should mainly aim to encourage people to migrate when the migrants￿region of
origin can be expected to gain from the out￿ ow. This reduces regional disparities to a
certain extent. However, our ￿ndings also con￿rm that the costs of integration decrease
in the presence of dominant groups of foreigners.
257 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of a culturally diverse population on regional income for
EU regions including parts of the European New Member States. We adopt a neoclassical
approach inspired by the Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1992) model and augment this model by
allowing labour heterogeneity with respect to the cultural background as the approach of
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) suggests. The research question is whether a culturally diverse
labour force has positive or negative e⁄ects on regional GDP per capita. While controlling
for regional and time ￿xed e⁄ects, our estimation results suggest that per capita GDP
increases when a region becomes more culturally diverse in two respects. First, we ￿nd
evidence that an increase in the number of foreigners raises regional GDP per capita.
Second, our estimates suggest that the presence of dominant groups reduces the costs of
integration and thus promotes income growth. Obviously, both channels capture positive
and negative e⁄ects of cultural diversity. The positive impact of dominant groups might
be due to a rough classi￿cation of the cultural backgrounds. It is argued that cultural
similarities exist within such a rough classi￿cation which therefore reduce the costs of
integration or the costs of an e¢ cient provision of migrant-speci￿c public goods.
In the discussion surrounding demographic change, immigration is seen as a way to
countervail labour shortages that may occur in the future. Our results suggest that
there are additional gains from immigration due to migrant-speci￿c skills that increase
productivity and thus income.
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